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A key challenge for the Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
is accelerating the rate of growth of the 
economy. For this to happen, various 
economic reforms need to be implemented. 
While some of these are in train, many 
remain within the long and sometimes 
windy pipelines of the bureaucracy. Here 
we draw lessons from the extant literature 
on aid, economic growth and the political 
economy of reform. We also consider the 
need for the ‘deep-rooting’ of independent 
institutions that can mediate between vested 
interests as part of the reform process so as 
to ensure its sustainability. These lessons 
could be particularly pertinent given new 
administrations in Solomon Islands and 
Australia, who are keen for new ideas to 
accelerate the pace of development. Among 
our recommendations are the support of 
institutional structures that help build 
constituencies for reform and more effective 
types of assistance that are non-financial but 
which generate real economic benefits.
Motivations 
The Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) will mark its 
fifth anniversary on 24 July 2008. It is time 
to reflect on the gains and the lessons 
of the past. It is also an opportunity to 
introduce change, given a new and willing 
administration in Honiara and the call for 
new ideas from an equally new and willing 
government in Australia.  
Within a very short time, the new 
Australian government has improved the 
previously strained relations with Solomon 
Islands. This success is due, in part, to 
the accident of simultaneous changes in 
governments in both countries. Equally 
important, however, has been the agreement 
by both prime ministers, Dr Derek Sikua 
in Solomon Islands and Kevin Rudd in 
Australia, that RAMSI can do better. The 
recent coup attempt in East Timor lends 
urgency to RAMSI’s efforts to rebuild 
Solomon Islands. 
The question currently facing the 
Australian government, therefore, is what 
are the major issues within RAMSI that 
need to be addressed in order to improve 
its effectiveness? Some commentators 
have recently been highly critical of the 
RAMSI intervention and its priorities. One 
of the main criticisms is that it has been 
too ‘Honiara centric’, with a large part 
of its efforts concentrated on rebuilding 
the country’s ineffective institutions and 
governance structures and too little attention 
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paid to delivering services to and alleviating 
the growth constraints on the country’s rural 
poor, who make up approximately 85 per 
cent of the population.
Critics of RAMSI argue that the 
intervention should focus its efforts on 
a variety of important types of service 
delivery—such as rural development, 
infrastructure, health and education—rather 
than on the wages of Australian and New 
Zealand bureaucrats. These types of services 
are said to have a much bigger impact 
on poverty reduction and, in some cases, 
economic growth. 
These criticisms have, however, been 
made without addressing the fundamental 
question about the nature of Australian 
assistance to the Solomons. Should Australia 
step into the role of service deliverer in 
the areas that the Solomon Islands so 
desperately needs, particularly in rural 
areas, or should it concentrate its efforts on 
equipping the Solomon Islands government 
with the resources and, more importantly, 
the capability to deliver these services for 
itself? A ‘helicopter-drop’ of resources and 
personnel produces short-term gains, but 
can be counter-productive in the longer 
term. Such an intervention also runs the 
risk of crowding out local capacity and 
enterprise and therefore taxing future 
growth. Depending on the magnitude of 
the short-term gains vis-à-vis the long-term 
losses and the society’s discount rate, the 
net effect could go either way. If, however, 
sustainability of the State is the core concern, 
letting locals take the lead in improving 
service delivery and pushing for structural 
reforms would be preferred over any 
quick gains made purely by the assistance 
program. 
The provision of resources for rural 
development, infrastructure, health and 
education projects must remain a central 
part of the reform and rebuilding effort. 
Helping the Solomon Islands government 
rebuild its central institutions of state and 
its ability to make effective policy decisions 
is, however, at the core of the development 
challenge. It will be a long, arduous and, at 
times, frustrating process. 
Having said this, improvements can 
and should be made in how this type 
of assistance is being delivered. On the 
institution-building side, it is argued 
that one possible way forward is the 
diversification of assistance towards 
enhancing the effectiveness of ex-ante and ex-
post policy review mechanisms. The Pacific 
Financial and Technical Assistance Centre 
(PFTAC) could play an increasingly useful 
role in this regard. On the service delivery 
side, Australia should play a leading role 
in the implementation of output-based aid 
initiatives. One practical example of where 
this could be initiated is the development of 
a progress-based education fund. Regional 
assistance to Solomon Islands also needs to 
be more mindful of the fact that current levels 
of financial transfers are likely to be well 
above the country’s absorptive capacity. As 
such, new methods of aid delivery which do 
not involve the transfer of financial assets to 
the small island economy, but which improve 
income-earning opportunities for Solomon 
Islanders, are required. Enhancing labour 
mobility between Australia and the Solomon 
Islands is identified as the most obvious and 
effective way forward for this agenda. 
Lessons from the literature and 
policy implications 
The process of state rebuilding can be split 
into two strands: creating and supporting 
institutions that will support and sustain 
changes leading to increases in income 
and employment; and helping to deliver 
the services required for an adequate 
level of social stability so that institutional 
improvements can take root. 
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Supporting institutions that build the 
constituency for reform
Economic institutions are now the centre 
of attention in development economics, 
following an era when their effective 
functioning was simply assumed within 
the confines of neoclassical economics. 
A large number of analyses using a 
variety of techniques—including cross-
country regressions—suggest that it is the 
quality of institutions, not variations in 
health, infrastructure, education or rural 
productivity, that is the single most important 
difference between those economies in the 
developing world that have grown strongly 
and those that have not. Examples of this 
research include Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
Rodrik et al. (2004) and North (1990, 1994).
These findings have, however, typically 
not produced particularly useful insights 
for foreign aid agencies in their search for 
how best to support the growth of recipient 
countries. It is one thing to recognise the 
importance of institutional quality but 
quite another to specify what determines 
quality and—more importantly—suggest 
how it might best be improved. One of the 
big challenges for RAMSI, then, has been to 
clarify what kinds of institutional support 
are most conducive to promoting structural 
reform efforts and—more importantly from 
a policy perspective—how to support the 
development of those institutions. 
First of all, it must be said that RAMSI 
has achieved some major reforms since it 
began in 2003. At the macroeconomic level, 
the previously rampant government deficit 
has been brought into surplus (Figure 1), 
which, together with a restructuring of 
public debt, has allowed the government to 
reduce its debt burden significantly (Figure 
2). These successes have been underpinned 
by important structural reforms, such as the 
new Foreign Investment Act (2006), removal 
Figure 1  Solomon Islands: government fiscal balance, 2000–2004
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2005b. Solomon Islands: selected issues and statistical appendix, IMF 
Country Report 05/364, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Available from http://www.imf.org/ex-
ternal/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05364.pdf.
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Figure 2  Solomon Islands: claims on government and public entities, 1978–2005 
(current SI$)
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Source: World Bank, 2007. World Development Indicators 2007, World Bank, Washington, DC. Available online at 
http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI (accessed 20 January 2008). 
of import duties on major international 
transport methods, streamlining of business 
regulation procedures and the initiation 
of a process of tax reform and improved 
compliance measures.1
These reforms have contributed to a 
significant increase in foreign investment 
(Figure 3) and export earnings (Figure 
4) and have helped to promote formal-
sector employment growth (Figure 5). 
Increased foreign investment and export 
earnings have led also to a greater degree 
of exchange-rate stability (Figure 6). 
Macroeconomic and exchange-rate stability 
have been accompanied by a significant 
increase in crop production since RAMSI’s 
arrival, with output levels now higher than 
they were before the conflict (Figure 7). 
All of this has helped generate moderate 
economic growth such that aggregate 
GDP is approaching its pre-conflict levels 
(Figures 8 and 9).2 The challenge is to 
sustain these positive developments for the 
foreseeable future.
While RAMSI has made a conscious 
effort to include as many stakeholders as 
possible in the development of its major 
reforms, the primary carriage of these 
reforms has, however, remained with 
the large number of technical advisers 
working within the bureaucracy. At 
present, these advisors occupy roles in 
most major areas of the Solomon Islands 
government and they have been given 
the responsibility of not only helping 
to achieve reform gains but of helping 
train their local counterparts to perform 
the roles for themselves after RAMSI’s 
departure.
Without doubt, this current technical 
and bureaucratic support has proven 
successful in achieving significant reform 
gains. There is, however, a broader 
question of whether it has helped (or 
is helping) to establish an institutional 
environment capable of pursuing reform 
once the donor presence is removed. Given 
the massive input of technical assistance 
132
Pacific  Economic  BullEtin
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 Number 1 2008 © Asia Pacific Press
Figure 3  Direct investment in Solomon Islands, 1989–2006 (US$ million)
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007. International Financial Statistics, CD Database 2007, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
(Figure 11), has it been ‘crowding in’ 
or ‘crowding out’ local capacity? The 
evidence is mixed, at best, but knowing 
the answer to the above question is critical 
to building local capacity for continuing 
reforms.
 Can RAMSI better support institutional 
development in Solomon Islands? Recent 
research has begun to help answer this 
question,3 providing guidance on why and 
how economic policy reform occurs and 
how to develop institutional mechanisms 
that encourage governments to adopt good 
or better economic policies (Dee 2008). 
The challenge for RAMSI is one of ‘deep-
rooting’ the processes of reform so that they 
remain after the departure of the donors. To 
date, efforts aimed at achieving this have 
focused heavily on the development of 
policy capacity and institutional support to 
Solomon Islands’ central government and 
line agencies. 
Given the central role of these agencies 
as the major driving force behind structural 
economic reforms, this focus has been 
prudent. Experience across the region 
shows increasingly, however, that what 
politicians have often needed to initiate 
reform is a credible independent agency 
to expose the various vested interests to 
public view. Moreover, central government 
agencies are rarely seen as independent 
arbitrators and assessors of economic 
reform options (Hosen 2007; Llanto and 
Gonzalez 2007; Wonder 2007).
In essence, this research shows the 
importance of independent institutions 
in an economy such as Solomon Islands. 
Developing an environment conducive 
to structural economic reform centres on 
the development of institutions capable 
of mediating these competing interests 
and which can build a coalition in favour 
of reform. A key strategy for achieving 
these outcomes is the development of 
independent policy review mechanisms. 
These types of institutions have been shown 
to help not only in providing a technical 
solution to the problem of identifying better 
policy reform options but by providing a 
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Figure 4  Solomon Islands: exports and imports, 1990–2006 (SI$ million)
Figure 5  Solomon Islands: formal-sector employment, 1999–2005 (‘000 persons)
Figure 6  Solomon Islands: official exchange rates, period average, 1970–2006 (SI$/US$)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007. International Financial Statistics, CD Database 2007, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
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Figure 7  Solomon Islands crop production index, 1961–1998 (2001=100)
Figure 8  Solomon Islands: GDP and GDP growth, 1968–2006 (constant US$)
Figure 9  Solomon Islands: GDP per capita, 1975–2006 (constant 2000 international $)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
Source: World Bank, 2007. World Development Indicators 2007, World Bank, Washington, DC. Available online at 
http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI (accessed 20 January 2008). 
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Figure 11 Solomon Islands: technical cooperation ODA, 1966–2006 (US$ million,  
constant 2005)
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2008. Aid Statistics, Development 
Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Geneva. Available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm (accessed 20 January 2008).
Figure 10 Solomon Islands: total ODA by donor, 1966–2006 (US$ million)
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strategy for managing change. Effective 
policy review mechanisms do this by
•	 helping to set the policy reform agenda
•	 setting the parameters of the debate 
about policy reform—for example, by 
establishing analytical frameworks in 
which all interests are represented
•	 de-politicising and raising the level of 
the debate on reform issues
•	 making clear who will gain and who 
will lose from special arrangements
•	 marshalling countervailing interests 
against special interests, therefore 
helping to build a coalition for reform
•	 identifying policy reform combinations 
wherein everyone benefits—that is, 
building a grand coalition for reform.
For a policy review mechanism to be 
effective in achieving these objectives, it 
must satisfy several important criteria
•	 independence; it must not be bound by 
current government policies, or have 
an explicit or implicit stake in existing 
policies
•	 an economy-wide view; it must consider 
the economic effects of policy options on 
all stakeholders
•	 transparency; it must use transparent 
processes of consultation so that all 
players can hear all the arguments; 
and its own recommendations to 
government must be made public.
Promoting greater levels of policy 
contestability also allows the public to 
understand and compare the trade-offs 
of reform across sectors as well as within 
sectors of the economy. This process of 
domestic debate is every bit as important 
as the specific recommendations made to 
government, as public acceptance of the 
relative merits of structural changes to the 
economy is essential not only for promoting 
reform but for sustaining it. Of course, in 
any reform process political will is of the 
utmost importance. The development of 
policy review processes can, however, assist 
by putting pressure on the political process 
to attend to the problems that they expose. 
In this respect, independent, credible policy 
review processes can often be a valuable 
addition to central government agencies as 
they have a greater capacity to expose the 
deficiencies of existing government policy. 
There is some anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that the public service in Solomon 
Islands remains highly politicised. It is 
therefore constrained in its ability to expose 
the vested interests of government and the 
urban élite, who yield significant power. 
A key task for RAMSI, therefore—given 
its renewed political relationships and 
mandate for reform—is to place an emphasis 
on identifying and developing institutional 
mechanisms capable of playing this external 
policy review role to build the country’s 
long-term capacity for reform. International 
financial institutions already serve this role, 
but to a limited extent.4
Current institutional strengthening 
efforts are already contributing to the 
process of public awareness of and debate 
about these issues. For example, there is now 
an extensive range of public consultations 
held with regional and local authorities as 
part of the annual budgeting process and 
community-based lobby groups are being 
given support. The RAMSI outreach program 
also seeks to inform the general public about 
the intervention and how they can better 
participate in the political process, helping 
to create a better-informed electorate. These 
are positive developments.5 
It is also important, however, that policy 
review processes are embedded outside 
the central bureaucracy to help create an 
institutional environment that is capable 
of exposing and mediating between the 
vested interests of the country’s urban and 
political élite. 
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Where, then, should these external policy 
review mechanisms come from? As with all 
institutions, policy review mechanisms have 
their roots in history and are highly country 
specific. Given the power asymmetries in 
Solomon Islands, the simple creation of a 
new external policy review agency might 
easily be taken over by bureaucrats and 
politicians who have a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo. Solomon Islands 
also has serious human capital capacity 
constraints, posing difficulties in filling the 
staffing requirements of any domestically 
based institution, particularly one requiring 
specialised skills.
The most obvious regionally based 
mechanism to perform this role would be 
the PFTAC, based in Fiji. To an extent, it is 
already doing this. PFTAC has, however, 
tended to concentrate its efforts in Solomon 
Islands on providing technical assistance,6 
addressing the problem of finding a technical 
solution to a reform challenge.
Institutional development in 
Solomon Islands
The major barriers to policy reform in 
Solomon Islands are, however, driven 
increasingly by a lack of political will 
rather than a lack of technical knowledge 
of what the best reform options are or how 
they should be carried out. Consider two 
major potential barriers to policy reform 
in Solomon Islands: the first is that the best 
policy options are not implemented because 
of a lack of capacity or technical knowledge 
about how to carry out reforms—that is, the 
government is unaware of the best policy 
option or is unable to implement it. The 
second is that good policies can be frustrated 
because of resistance from vested interest 
groups. The government itself might have 
a direct interest in keeping poor policies in 
place and/or the political parties in power 
have benefactors likely to lose from change. 
The second barrier is compounded by the 
Figure 12 Total overseas development assistance, 1972–2005 (per cent of GNI)
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presence of large information asymmetries 
in Solomon Islands, such as those between 
the public and the few, well-organised lobby 
groups. With the deployment of RAMSI and 
with the continued support of mechanisms 
such as PFTAC,7 the cause of a lack of reform 
tends increasingly to fall into the latter of 
these categories. 
As such, new institutional strengthening 
efforts need to focus more on building a 
constituency for reform rather than creating 
technical knowledge for what reform needs 
to occur. Policy reviews aimed at analysing 
the gains and losses to all players—not just 
the vested interests—can help in this regard 
by marshalling countervailing interests to 
strengthen domestic institutions in favour 
of the public interest (Dee 2008:50).
A 2005 review of PFTAC found that its 
activities should be defined more clearly 
in terms of an overall strategy that would 
acknowledge the three distinct types of 
assistance: ad hoc advice, capacity-building 
assistance and longer-term reform assistance 
(IMF 2005a). This type of continuing policy 
review assistance would provide a useful 
addition to the last of these categories and 
would help enormously with overcoming 
the large number of vested interests within 
the country and help to build a greater 
constituency for reform. 
Such a function could be utilised also as 
a major capacity-building tool for RAMSI 
by allowing domestic bureaucrats to work 
within the review office at relevant points, 
gaining invaluable skills of policy review 
and analysis. In time—as locals built up the 
requisite skills—review teams could even 
be made up almost entirely of Solomon 
Islanders. By creating an environment 
of improved policy contestability and 
transparency and by crowding in rather 
than crowding out local capacity, this 
type of assistance is likely to provide a 
significant boost to the reform efforts being 
undertaken. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge of this 
approach would be the ability of such a 
review office to generate the requisite political 
cooperation required for ex-ante policy 
reviews, particularly in an environment 
such as Solomon Islands where members 
of the government are sometimes the major 
beneficiaries of such reforms.8 
Australia could play a key role in 
this regard by imposing constraints on 
the disbursement of further assistance 
conditional on the satisfactory provision 
of information to the review office, which 
enables it to carry out effective, timely review 
processes. Although there is significant 
evidence to suggest that aid is most effective 
when delivered to good policy environments,9 
trying to reward good policy decisions has 
been an inherently difficult process for 
donor countries given the subjective and 
political overlays in the decision-making 
process.10 This has led to the creation of some 
elaborate ranking and scoring mechanisms 
by a number of research institutes, most 
notably by the Millennium Challenge 
Account.11 These approaches (which rely 
on subjective perception-based indicators 
of policy performance) are, however, vague 
at best and many donors have shied away 
from using them to determine aid allocations. 
Linking performance payments to the 
satisfactory completion of policy processes 
(as opposed to outcomes) would still pose 
challenges, but could help to circumvent 
many of these difficulties. 
In this situation, policy could be 
reviewed ex-ante and ex-post equally by 
central agencies and with the review office 
giving an annual, or bi-annual, assessment 
of cooperation by domestic policymakers 
providing a litmus test for government 
commitment to reform. The independence 
of the multilateral organisations would also 
add a degree of credibility to Australian 
efforts to reward good bureaucratic 
behaviour, or punish bad. 
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Aid effectiveness
It is now accepted within the aid-effectiveness 
literature that significant non-linearities exist 
with regard to the impact of aid on economic 
growth (Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004; 
Hansen and Tarp 2001). Several cross-country 
studies show, for example, that the marginal 
return to aid tends to decline as the amount 
of aid increases, so that—after a certain 
level—additional aid has little or no effect 
on growth (Collier and Dollar 2002; Hansen 
and Tarp 2001; Radelet et al. 2005).12
This foreign aid ‘saturation point’ is 
generally considered to be a function of 
the recipient’s economic, political and 
cultural circumstances, with factors such 
as macroeconomic conditions, institutional 
and policy performance, infrastructure (or 
physical capital) levels, level of human 
capital and a variety of socio-cultural 
constraints contributing to the amount of 
aid a country can absorb. For example, 
as binding constraints on capacity are 
reached, skilled labour costs rise, physical 
infrastructure congestion increases logistical 
costs, administrative bottlenecks become 
overwhelming, public sector fiscal behaviour 
begins to distort and assistance efforts begin 
to soak up or crowd out domestic capacity; 
therefore, the returns to aid fall.
For the majority of studies, the implied 
saturation point of aid ranges between 15 
and 45 per cent of GDP. This provides an 
idea of the maximum level of aid flows that 
most recipient countries can absorb without 
the negative effects of foreign aid beginning 
to outweigh the positive (Clemens and 
Radelet 2003:7).
Since 2001, and accelerating with the 
RAMSI intervention in 2003, the volume of 
Australian assistance to Solomon Islands has 
increased dramatically, from approximately 
12 per cent of gross national income (GNI) to 
more than 65 per cent of GNI. The largest part 
of the aid has been in the form of technical 
assistance (Figures 10, 11 and 12). While 
analytical work to determine the optimal 
level of aid flow has yet to be done,13 recent 
levels are likely to be well above the desirable 
level given the country’s weak institutional 
foundations and public sector capacity, low 
levels of human capital and limited physical 
infrastructure—particularly when such a 
large increase has occurred so quickly.
The rapid increase in foreign assistance 
to Solomon Islands poses some important 
macroeconomic risks for RAMSI. How can 
RAMSI improve the effectiveness of its 
support?
Incentives of aid delivery
A growing body of literature highlights the 
large range of adverse incentives faced by 
donor agencies and the impact that this has 
on the efficiency of their service delivery 
(Easterly 2003). The basic premise behind 
this argument is that the delivery of services 
is most efficient when the responsible 
organisation has an incentive structure that 
induces it to behave similarly to a firm in a 
free-market economy. Because this is often 
not the case in aid bureaucracies, they do 
not behave in a way that maximises the 
efficiency of their service delivery. There are 
various reasons for this.
Insufficient feedback from aid recipients to 
donors. While the private sector responds to 
price signals to provide goods and services 
that are in demand, the aid bureaucracy 
must adopt a supply-driven approach, 
which does not allow it to allocate resources 
to their most highly valued uses. 
A lack of accountability to aid recipients. 
In a competitive environment, the private 
sector continually seeks out more efficient 
methods of production and service delivery, 
but aid donors are rarely held accountable 
for failing to achieve their objectives. 
Because of this, they have little incentive to 
improve the quality or efficiency of service 
delivery.
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A lack of competitive pressures. While 
the private sector seeks to maximise profits 
by minimising operational costs, allowing 
firms to capture a larger market share from 
other producers, aid agencies operate in 
an environment that Easterly (2003) calls 
‘the cartel of good intentions’. Aid agencies 
generally do not compete to provide 
services to recipients of aid; therefore, more 
efficient organisations cannot capture a 
larger share of the aid delivery market—nor 
are inefficient suppliers squeezed out. As a 
result, aid agencies have little incentive to 
minimise costs (Chand and Batten 2007).
Improving aid delivery
One of the most promising methods for 
providing incentives for the delivery of 
aid in Pacific island countries—which has 
been achieving some of the most hopeful 
results in Africa and South America in 
recent years—focuses on providing greater 
clarity for the objectives of aid projects 
and increased transparency on progress 
regarding its achievements (and failures). 
This aid modality has taken on many forms, 
including ‘output-based aid’, ‘payments 
for progress’ and ‘progress-based aid’; 
the basic principle underlying each is to 
link aid payments to specific measures of 
progress within each project (Chand and 
Batten 2007).
A payments-for-progress system, for 
example, would focus on tying the delivery 
of aid to the satisfaction of requirements 
for making advances in outcomes on the 
ground. Donors would bind themselves 
to pay a predetermined amount for clear 
evidence of progress against each one 
of the goals agreed to with the recipient 
government. The onus would then rest 
with the recipient government to present an 
independently audited statement reporting 
its progress on each of the measures. 
Payments would be determined as a 
function of the outcomes—not linked to the 
implementation of any particular policy, 
any other intermediate outputs or ‘tied’ 
to purchases from particular suppliers or 
companies. The key point is that when the 
recipient government finds a way to deliver 
a service in a cost-effective manner, it will 
be rewarded with more funding—therefore 
freeing up an even larger amount of 
resources.
The other important element in this 
type of system is that it gives a significant 
degree of flexibility and autonomy to local, 
ground-level institutions, which creates 
space for local institutional experimentation 
while ensuring that aid pays only for 
achievements. The benefits of such systems 
are being increasingly well documented, 
perhaps most prominently by researchers 
at the Centre of Global Development in 
Washington, DC (for example, Barder and 
Birdsall 2006).
This work highlights that these types 
of schemes impose increased levels of 
accountability on recipient governments. 
For example, if parents know that funding 
is available for their government to meet 
the costs of providing primary education 
for all children, unencumbered by any 
other conditionality, this permits them to 
hold the government accountable for public 
schooling. Such schemes also demand 
increased accountability of donors; if donors 
agree to be held jointly and severally liable 
for their commitment to pay for progress, 
they can exert peer pressure to bear the 
costs as they fall due. There are, of course, 
difficulties associated with these types 
of aid modalities, and it has been shown 
that simplicity in program design and 
transparency of outcomes are critical for 
this mechanism to deliver.
While improving policy performance 
and institution building should remain 
the core focus of RAMSI, there is still an 
important role to be played in delivering 
important services to the people of 
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Solomon Islands. Experimentation with 
new aid delivery modalities that harness 
the power of economic incentives should 
become a central focus of the Australian 
government. While AusAID has been an 
active supporter of global initiatives such 
as the Global Partnership for Output-
Based Aid, it has been relatively slow in 
its own uptake. In part, this could be due 
to a degree of risk aversion surrounding 
the potential political consequences of 
failed projects; the delivery of foreign 
aid is a grey science at best. Experience 
shows, however, that experimentation 
is often the key to improvements in aid 
quality. Challenging the status quo—while 
occasionally resulting in failure—can lead to 
dramatic improvements in service quality. 
What is more, failure in one policy area can 
offer important lessons for the design of 
other policies.
One possibility that holds promise for 
Solomon Islands, as well as for other Pacific 
island countries such as Papua New Guinea, 
is the introduction of a progress-based 
education fund (PEF). Access to quality 
education for the people of Solomon Islands 
remains relatively poor despite the huge 
levels of assistance being received. There are 
several reasons for this, including deficient 
supply and demand for education services. 
A PEF could help correct both.
A PEF essentially mimics the positive 
incentive effects of the market, whereby a 
price is set for progress in education and 
funds are allocated on the basis of progress 
made by schools. Providing funds to 
schools for progress made in educational 
outcomes also places resources at the front-
end of service delivery. There are, of course, 
detailed requirements relating to how such a 
system would work (which can be found in 
Chand 2007). These requirements could be 
adjusted and set in motion through a pilot 
scheme, which would allow 10 or so selected 
schools to access the program.
Potential long-term benefits of 
labour mobility
Another significant point to emerge from 
the economic growth literature is the 
important role that access to foreign labour 
markets can play in inducing improvements 
in living standards in the source country. 
There is a great deal of literature showing 
that the largest gains in global welfare 
would accrue from freeing up movement of 
unskilled labour (Winters et al. 2003; Martin 
2003; Athukorala 2004) and the Pacific is 
by no means an exception. Income earned 
from workers abroad is likely to provide 
a sustainable source of revenue for the 
Solomon Islands government and relieve 
some of the resource constraints it currently 
faces. Remittances already constitute a 
significant part of the economies of Fiji, Niue, 
Samoa and Tonga (Narsey 2004). Easing 
conditions for the (temporary) movement of 
unskilled workers would give remittances 
an even greater role in the sustenance 
of the island economies—and remote 
communities—of the Pacific. Such flows—if 
temporary—would prevent depopulation of 
the smallest of such communities. Reverse 
flows of retirees, tourists and volunteers, 
moreover, would generate employment 
opportunities within remote communities. 
Allowing for reciprocal arrangements on 
temporary flows between developing and 
industrial-country partners will assist such a 
process while deepening cultural, economic 
and political ties across the region.
Policy debates about temporary worker 
schemes have highlighted that they entail 
risks. Concerns are often raised about 
‘brain drain’, depopulation, depression 
of recipient country wages, overstaying, 
poor treatment of temporary workers, 
the migration of criminals and migrants’ 
access to local services. Experiences across 
the region with labour mobility indicate, 
however, that many of the problems of 
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labour mobility are not as pervasive as 
once thought. Depopulation, for example, 
is the least of concerns for countries such as 
Samoa and Tonga, which have historically 
experienced large outflows of labour. This is 
because large islander communities already 
exist in the industrialised countries of the 
Pacific Rim. Samoans and Tongans living 
in Auckland, Sydney and Los Angeles 
maintain regular contact with their kin at 
home. These overseas communities form 
the basis of regular international trade and 
commerce.
Chand (2004) and the World Bank 
(2006) provide more detailed discussion 
of the remaining risks and how they can 
be managed. There is also a large and 
growing literature on the potentially 
large gains to Australia from allowing 
temporary movement of Pacific islanders 
into its labour market (Winters et al. 2003; 
Martin 2003). Deepening labour markets 
can therefore be welfare enhancing for 
the region as a whole. The challenge for 
the Australian government is to design a 
scheme that will maximise the benefits of 
a temporary worker scheme for Australia 
and the Pacific. The final section of this 
paper elaborates on the design of such an 
effective scheme.
A well-designed labour mobility 
scheme could also improve incentives 
for educational attainment in Solomon 
Islands. Clearly, in countries such as 
Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, 
parents withdraw their children from 
primary school because—with limited job 
prospects—they see little point in investing 
in their education. The idea would be to 
link temporary access to the Australian 
labour market to the achievement of a 
base level of education—for example, 
the Year 8 Certificate—a level that could 
equip the worker with the language skills 
to communicate in English. This type of 
scheme would offer benefits over and 
above a typical unskilled visa arrangement, 
including but not limited to
•	 providing an incentive for young 
Solomon Islanders to demand higher 
levels of educational attainment, thus 
increasing their propensity to stay in 
school
•	 improving the capacity of migrant 
workers to function effectively while 
working in Australia 
•	 promoting a net ‘brain gain’ in Solomon 
Islands, as guest workers eventually 
return home and form part of a more 
skilled workforce
•	 not limiting Australian labour market 
access to élite Solomon Islanders, as 
is the case with the current skilled 
migration visa program.
Concluding remarks 
While the political and economic gains 
made in Solomon Islands remain fragile, 
recent developments there give a sense of 
renewed hope in its ability to overcome 
its major development challenges. Recent 
criticisms of RAMSI have often been made 
without appropriate consideration of the 
longer-term implications of an Australian-
led boost in service delivery aid. Rebuilding 
the central institutions of the State so that 
they can then themselves improve the 
quality of service delivery to the rural 
majority should remain the core focus of the 
intervention; better still would be the case 
where such an improvement is induced by 
demand from within Solomon Islands.
Moving towards a brighter economic 
future does, however, require a tweaking 
of convention in the approach to aid. 
Experimentation—and the risk of failure that 
this entails—is to be welcomed rather than 
avoided. Lessons from these experiments 
have the potential to contribute to improving 
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aid effectiveness. As outlined in this paper, a 
move away from project-based aid towards 
performance-based incentive schemes is 
worthy of consideration. At best, it has a 
chance of improving the quality of service 
delivery; at worst, it could provide lessons 
about what else could be done. Furthermore, 
a focus on strengthening the existing non-
governmental institutions within the 
country as a means of embedding a process 
of continued rather than one-off policy 
review provides one way of overcoming the 
many obstacles to policy reform. 
Finally, Australia needs to look at 
creative ways to develop Solomon Islands’ 
economy without overwhelming it with 
huge inflows of financial and technical 
assistance. Australia must be careful, 
however, that in scaling back the large 
financial assistance of recent years it does 
not create excessive levels of financial 
volatility. One feasible way of assisting the 
development of Solomon Islands without 
placing further pressure on its capacity 
constraints would be increased labour 
mobility into Australia.
Notes
1 Detailed descriptions of these reform efforts 
can be found at www.ramsi.org 
2 Albeit from a low base after the massive 
contraction of the economy in 2001. 
3 This research is being discussed widely across 
the Asian region and is making a significant 
contribution to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) structural reform agenda 
first discussed in Sydney in 2007. The reform 
agenda will be discussed further at an APEC 
ministerial meeting in Melbourne later this 
year. 
4 Examples include the World Bank’s ‘cost of 
doing business’ surveys and the International 
Monetary Fund’s Article IV reports.
5 Other efforts that have made a significant 
contr ibut ion  to  s t rengthening  the 
accountability of policymakers have occurred 
through the Leadership Code Commission, 
the Ombudsman’s Office and the Auditor-
General’s Office.
6 PFTAC carries out an average of more than 
50 technical assistance missions each year 
to its 15 member countries with at least one 
capacity-building exercise embedded in every 
technical assistance intervention. PFTAC also 
focuses on organising a number of regional 
forums to share experiences and best practices. 
Shorter-term assistance includes attachments 
between member countries, PFTAC and 
relevant agencies as well as ad hoc responses to 
member requests on specific issues (see www.
pftac.org for more information). 
7 The ADB, in conjunction with funding from 
AusAID, has also contributed important 
technical reports at the bequest of the Solomon 
Islands Finance Department, such as State-
owned enterprise reforms and private sector 
participation (ADB 2007) and Diagnostic 
assessment of inter-island transport (ADB 2006).
8 Ex-post policy review tends not to require 
the same level of political or bureaucratic 
cooperation given that the policy has already 
been made public. 
9 See, for example, Burnside and Dollar (2000, 
2004). 
10 This process is made all the more difficult 
in countries such as Solomon Islands, 
where many subjective indicators of policy 
performance constructed by a variety of think 
tanks and research centres are not available. 
11 See www.mca.gov. 
12 While aid effectiveness refers to the total return 
on aid, a country’s absorption capacity for aid 
is about the marginal rate of return to aid.
13 The economy-wide MAMS model developed 
by the World Bank to analyse ‘Millennium 
Development Goal’ scenarios—but now 
applied regularly to questions of absorption 
capacity—could be useful for this task. This 
would also offer a useful point of engagement 
for the bank, which is seeking to increase its 
assistance to fragile states. MAMS is a general 
equilibrium model that traces the impact 
of aid via its impact on markets for labour, 
goods and services, and foreign exchange and 
its impact on social welfare and economic 
outcomes. These outcomes flow back into 
the model to form a dynamic equilibrium. 
See Bourguignon et al. (2004).
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